Nervous shock: liability for psychiatric injury
LUG-101 Law of Torts including Motor Vehicle Accident and Consumer Protection Act, Unit III: Nervous shock. · LLB · 60 min
When is a negligent defendant liable for shock and psychiatric illness, as distinct from physical injury? The lecture traces the growth of the law from the refusal in Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas (1888), through fear for oneself (Dulieu v. White, 1901) and fear for one's children (Hambrook v. Stokes, 1925), the unforeseeable plaintiff (Bourhill v. Young, 1943), the "immediate aftermath" (McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 1983), to the control mechanisms for secondary victims in Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1992) and the rule for primary victims in Page v. Smith (1996), with a note on rescuers, intentional infliction of shock (Wilkinson v. Downton) and the Indian position. It answers 2022-23 Q5(c).
Objectives
- Explain what "nervous shock" means in law and why grief and ordinary distress are not enough.
- Trace the development of liability from Coultas to Alcock and state what each case added.
- Distinguish primary from secondary victims and apply the Alcock control mechanisms.
- Apply Page v. Smith to a primary victim and explain the role of foreseeability of physical injury.
- State the principles in a structured answer and apply them to problem facts.
Slides
- What is nervous shock?
- The starting point: Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas (1888)
- Fear for oneself: Dulieu v. White and Sons (1901)
- Fear for others: Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. (1925)
- The unforeseeable plaintiff: Bourhill v. Young (1943)
- The immediate aftermath: McLoughlin v. O'Brian (1983)
- Secondary victims and the control mechanisms: Alcock (1992)
- Primary victims: Page v. Smith (1996); rescuers and employees
- Indian position
- The principles in summary
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