Legal DictionaryTerms of art, in plain words

Latin ab (from) + initio (beginning). A minor's agreement is void ab initio (Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, 1903); a marriage within prohibited degrees is void ab initio under s. 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Sentence: "An agreement without consideration is void ab initio and cannot be ratified later."

After the oleum gas leak from Shriram's Delhi factory, a year after Bhopal, Bhagwati CJ refused to be bound by a nineteenth-century English rule and declared that a hazardous enterprise owes an "absolute and non-delegable duty" to the community: if harm results, it pays, and it cannot plead act of God, sabotage by a stranger or the victim's own fault. The richer the enterprise, the larger the compensation, so that the rule deters. The rule was applied to pollution in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (polluter pays) and underlies the Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 and s. 17 of the National Green Tribunal Act 2010. In the exam, "absolute liability" means M.C. Mehta; contrast it point by point with Rylands v. Fletcher, and mention Salmond's older use of the phrase for liability without mens rea.

The Claims Tribunal treats a report forwarded under s. 159 as an application for compensation (s. 166(4)), and on receiving information of the accident through it the insurer designates an officer to offer a settlement (s. 149). Example: a victim who has not filed his own claim within six months may rely on the report already before the Tribunal. The procedure grew out of the Delhi claims procedure commended in Jai Prakash v. National Insurance (2010).

The 2018-19 paper printed "accomplish" (the ordinary verb, to achieve) where "accomplice" was meant. An accomplice who is granted a pardon on condition of making a full disclosure is an "approver" (s. 343 BNSS; s. 306 CrPC). Sentence: "The driver who waited outside with the engine running was an accomplice in the robbery."

In English law a promise to accept less in full settlement needed fresh consideration (Pinnel's case, Foakes v. Beer), which is why the two words are used: the accord alone binds nobody until it is satisfied. The Indian Act is more generous: s. 63 and its illustrations let the promisee accept Rs 2,000 in full discharge of Rs 5,000 with no consideration at all. Compromise of a disputed claim and 'full and final settlement' receipts are accord and satisfaction in practice.

The word is both adjective and noun ("the accused person", "the accused"). Before charge he may be called the suspect; after conviction, the convict; in an appeal, the appellant. In a civil case the word is wrong: the party sued is the defendant. Sentence: "The accused was produced before the magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest."

Lord Westbury described it as "circumstances which no human foresight can provide against". An earthquake, an unprecedented flood or lightning may qualify; ordinary monsoon rain does not. In Nichols v. Marsland (1876) artificial lakes burst in the heaviest rainfall within memory and the owner was not liable. In Ramalinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar (1971) the looting of a lorry by a mob was held not to be an act of God, because human acts are excluded. In India it is no defence to an enterprise engaged in a hazardous activity (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1987).

In Buron v. Denman (1848) a British naval officer freed slaves and burnt a Spanish slave trader's barracoons in West Africa; the Crown ratified his act, and the trader's suit failed. The plea is not available against the State's own subjects in respect of their legal rights (Walker v. Baird, 1892). It is different from sovereign immunity, which concerns the State's liability to its own people for its servants' torts under Article 300.

Exceptions: the Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 1855 (wrongs to the deceased's property), the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and s. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (compensation to dependants), and s. 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (all causes of action survive except defamation, assault and other personal injuries not causing death). In Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair (1986) a defamation appeal abated on the plaintiff's death. Sentence: "The defamation suit abated when the plaintiff died: actio personalis moritur cum persona."

Walking across someone's land without permission is a tort even if you harm nothing; the owner recovers at least nominal damages. The rule rests on injuria sine damno: Holt CJ in Ashby v. White (1703) said "every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing". By contrast negligence, nuisance and slander (except in special cases) are actionable only on proof of damage.

A rule of justice that every court applies under its inherent power (s. 151 CPC) and through restitution (s. 144 CPC). In Jang Singh v. Brij Lal (1966) the Supreme Court held that a judgment-debtor who deposited a smaller sum because the court office had miscalculated the amount could not be made to suffer for the court's error. Sentence: "The appeal was dismissed on a date the court itself had wrongly notified; applying actus curiae neminem gravabit, the dismissal was recalled."

The maxim is quoted from Coke's Institutes (17th century) and goes back to St Augustine. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 builds the mental element into every offence with words such as "intentionally", "knowingly", "dishonestly", "voluntarily", and its General Exceptions (ss. 14-44) excuse acts done without a guilty mind. In Nathulal v. State of M.P. (1966) the Supreme Court held that mens rea is an ingredient of a statutory offence unless the statute excludes it expressly or by necessary implication. Sentence: "Since the accused believed in good faith that the goods were his own, the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea saves him from a conviction for theft."

An omission is an actus reus only where there is a legal duty to act (s. 3(4) BNS: "act" includes illegal omissions). Thought alone is never punishable: a man who plans a murder but does nothing commits no offence, though preparation may be punished for some grave offences (e.g. dacoity). Sentence: "The actus reus of theft is the moving of movable property out of the possession of another."

The Act replaced the older vakils, pleaders, barristers and attorneys with the single class of advocate. An Advocate-on-Record is an advocate who has passed the Supreme Court's examination and alone may file cases there. Sentence: "Only an advocate enrolled with a State Bar Council may file a vakalatnama."

From Medieval Latin affidavit, "he has declared on oath". Writ petitions, bail applications and evidence-in-chief in civil suits (Order XVIII Rule 4) are supported by affidavits. Sentence: "The petition is supported by an affidavit of the petitioner's father."

The Act draws the line at the passing of property: in a sale the buyer becomes owner at once, in an agreement to sell he does not. The difference decides who bears the risk if the goods perish (s. 26), whether the seller can sue for the price or only for damages, who can claim the goods on the other party's insolvency, and whether the seller can pass a good title to a second buyer. Example: 'Since the wheat was still to be weighed, the contract was only an agreement to sell and the loss by fire fell on the seller.' It is the first question in any goods dispute: had property passed?

Plural amici curiae. The Supreme Court appoints an amicus in most PILs and in death-sentence appeals; in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) and the migrant workers matter senior advocates assisted as amici. The amicus owes a duty to the court, not to any party. Sentence: "As the accused had no counsel, the court appointed an amicus curiae to argue the appeal."

Hochster v. De la Tour (1853): a courier engaged for a June tour was told in May that he was not wanted, and could sue in May. Frost v. Knight (1872): a man who promised to marry a woman after his father's death broke off the engagement while the father lived, and was liable at once. The illustration to s. 39 is the singer who refuses to sing after two nights. If the promisee elects to keep the contract alive, he takes the risk that a later event (frustration) may excuse the other side.

The party appealing is the appellant, the other the respondent; the appellate court may confirm, reverse, vary or remand. Distinguish revision (supervisory, on jurisdiction) and review (by the same court). Sentence: "The appeal was allowed and the decree of the trial court was set aside."

Either the plaintiff or the defendant may become the appellant; in a criminal appeal the convict is usually the appellant, and the State is the appellant when it appeals against an acquittal. Sentence: "The appellant was convicted under s. 103 BNS and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Sessions Judge."

An application is made within or alongside a main proceeding; a petition starts one. The matching exercise in the 2023-24 paper pairs "application" with "applicant" as "plaint" goes with "plaintiff". Sentence: "The applicant prays that he be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond with two sureties."

From Old French atorné, one appointed. A "general power of attorney" (GPA) is often, and wrongly, used in India as a substitute for a sale deed; the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp v. State of Haryana (2012) held that it conveys no title. Sentence: "The property was sold through her attorney, who held a registered power of attorney."

Applied in England in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) even where the statute was silent; in India Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) held that the "procedure established by law" under Art. 21 must be fair, and fairness includes a hearing. It covers notice, disclosure of the evidence, a chance to reply and, where fairness demands, a reasoned order. Exceptions: emergency, admitted facts, express statutory exclusion. Sentence: "The dismissal of the clerk without a show-cause notice violated audi alteram partem and was set aside."

"Bail is the rule, jail the exception" (State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, 1977), because the accused is presumed innocent and Art. 21 protects liberty. Bail may be cancelled for tampering with witnesses or absconding. The BNSS now defines bail, bond and bail bond (s. 2(1)(b), (d), (e)). Sentence: "The accused was released on bail on furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with one surety."

Slapping, pushing, spitting at or grabbing someone without consent is battery, even if no injury results: "the least touching of another in anger is a battery" (Cole v. Turner, 1704). Everyday contact such as jostling in a crowd is not (Collins v. Wilcock, 1984). A blow from behind is battery without assault. The criminal parallels are force and criminal force (ss. 128-129 BNS).

Used as an adjective ("a bona fide purchaser for value without notice") and as an adverb ("he acted bona fide"). A "bona fide certificate" from a college certifies that the student is genuinely on its rolls. The opposite is mala fide. Sentence: "The buyer who paid full value without notice of the earlier sale is a bona fide purchaser and is protected."

Exceptions under s. 16: where the buyer makes known the purpose and relies on the seller's skill, where goods are bought by description from a dealer (merchantable quality), where trade usage implies a warranty, and where the seller fraudulently conceals a defect. The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 has moved the law towards caveat venditor (let the seller beware). Sentence: "The buyer inspected the second-hand car before purchase and the seller hid nothing, so caveat emptor defeats his claim."

When goods were simple and could be inspected, the law told the buyer to look out for himself. With sealed, complex and advertised products the buyer must rely on the seller, so the law now puts the risk on the seller: implied conditions of fitness and merchantable quality (Sale of Goods Act 1930, s. 16), the manufacturer's duty of care (Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932) and, under the Consumer Protection Act 2019, unfair trade practices, recall of goods and strict product liability (s. 84). Exam questions ask about the 'shift from caveat emptor to caveat venditor'.

Certiorari corrects a decision already made; prohibition stops a body from proceeding further. Both lie against bodies acting judicially or quasi-judicially (Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955). Sentence: "The order of the Rent Tribunal, passed without notice to the tenant, was quashed by a writ of certiorari."

Colloquially the "challan". If the police find no case they file a closure (final) report instead. Failure to file the charge sheet within sixty or ninety days of arrest entitles the accused to default bail (s. 187 BNSS; s. 167 CrPC). In service law a charge sheet is the memorandum of charges in a departmental enquiry. Sentence: "The police filed the charge sheet against four accused under ss. 103 and 61 of the BNS."

Austin, a former army officer, pictured law as an order from above: the sovereign (a determinate superior habitually obeyed by the bulk of society and obeying no one) commands, the subject is under a duty, and the evil threatened for disobedience is the sanction. Customs, international law, constitutional law and the laws of God are not law 'properly so called'. Maine, Salmond, Bryce and Hart showed what the model leaves out (customs, permissive and power-conferring rules, the federal and democratic sovereign), yet it remains the first theory every examiner asks about.

A complaint is not a police report; a magistrate examines the complainant on oath before issuing process (s. 223 BNSS; s. 200 CrPC). In a defamation or cheque-dishonour case the complainant is the real prosecutor. Sentence: "The complainant alleged that the accused had issued a cheque knowing that the account was closed."

A bus passenger is injured when the bus and a truck, both driven negligently, collide. He was not at fault, so he can recover his whole compensation from either owner or insurer, leaving them to divide the burden between themselves. The Supreme Court explained the distinction from contributory negligence (the victim's own fault) in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan (2008).

Whether a stipulation is a condition or a warranty depends on the construction of the contract, not the label the parties use (s. 12(4)). Under s. 13 a buyer may waive a condition or elect to treat its breach as a breach of warranty, and must do so once he has accepted the goods in a non-severable contract. The Act implies conditions as to title, description, fitness, merchantability and sample (ss. 14 to 17) and warranties of quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances. Example: 'Delivery of a 1.5 litre car when the contract said 2 litres broke a condition, so the buyer rejected it.' Commercial lawyers meet the distinction in every dispute about defective goods.

A confession is a species of admission in criminal law; an admission of a single incriminating fact is not a confession. A retracted confession needs corroboration. Sentence: "The confession made in the police station was inadmissible, and the prosecution had to rely on the recovery of the weapon."

Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864): two ships named Peerless, one party meaning the October ship and the other the December ship; no consensus, no contract. The Latin is also written 'consensus ad idem' in judgments and 'ad idem' alone in shorthand ('the parties were never ad idem'). It is the idea behind the whole of s. 13; the vitiating factors of s. 14 (coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, mistake) are the ways the consensus may be defective.

Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983): Rs 30,000 for 14 years of illegal detention after acquittal; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993): compensation for a custodial death, the liability being strict and sovereign immunity no defence; D.K. Basu (1997): arrest guidelines and compensation for custodial violence. The award is in addition to any damages in a civil suit, which may be adjusted against it.

The consumer is the person the whole Act protects. A family member using a refrigerator bought by the father, or a child treated in a hospital his parents paid, is a consumer too (Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia, 1998). A taxi driver who drives his own car for a living is a consumer; a company buying a fleet for profit is not (Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, 1995). Since 2019 online, teleshopping, direct-selling and multi-level-marketing purchases are expressly included. The 1986 definition was s. 2(1)(d).

A complaint becomes a consumer dispute only when the trader or service provider contests it. If a shopkeeper replaces a defective mixer as soon as he gets the notice, there was a complaint but no dispute; if he says the mixer is fine, the Commission must settle the dispute under s. 38, if needed by sending the mixer to a laboratory. The District, State and National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions take their names from it.

The Act's own illustration: A contracts to pay B Rs 10,000 if B's house is burnt. English law calls these conditional contracts. Unlike a wager (s. 30), both parties have a real interest in the event and the event is only collateral, so the contract is valid. Bashir Ahmed v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1970) separates a contingent contract from an absolute one with a term about performance; Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta (2015) applied s. 32 to a land sale that depended on a union's consent.

A pillion rider without a helmet is hurt when a speeding car hits the motorcycle. The car driver is negligent, but the rider also failed to protect himself, so his compensation for head injuries is reduced. At common law any such fault defeated the claim entirely (Butterfield v. Forrester, 1809), softened by the last opportunity rule (Davies v. Mann, 1842); England introduced apportionment in 1945, and Indian courts follow it (Rural Transport Service v. Bezlum Bibi, Calcutta 1980).

Conversion is dealing with someone else's goods as if they were your own: selling, destroying, using, wrongly delivering or refusing to return them. Good faith is no defence: a broker who innocently bought and resold cotton obtained by a fraudster was liable for its full value (Hollins v. Fowler, 1875). The usual remedy is damages equal to the value of the goods; banks that collect cheques for the wrong person are a common modern example, subject to s. 131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881.

Salomon v. Salomon (1897) is the classic case: once registered, the company is a different person from the shareholders, its debts are its own and the members' liability is limited. The corporation acts through its organs (board, general meeting) and agents, holds property, sues and is sued in its own name and survives changes of membership. Unincorporated bodies such as a partnership firm, a club or a Hindu joint family are not corporations aggregate, though procedure sometimes lets them sue in a collective name. Courts may 'lift the veil' where the corporate form is used for fraud or to evade the law.

The purpose is continuity: property and rights attach to the office and pass to the next holder without any conveyance, so that 'the King never dies'. The holder has a double capacity, his natural capacity as a private person and his official capacity as the corporation. In India the Official Trustee (Official Trustees Act, 1913) and the Administrator-General (Administrators-General Act, 1963) are expressly made corporations sole; the Post Master General and similar offices are also cited. Compare the corporation aggregate, a group of co-existing persons united into one legal person.

Corpus does not need continuous bodily contact: a man possesses the furniture in his locked house while he is away, and an occupier possesses the rings buried in his land though he does not know of them (South Staffordshire Water v. Sharman). Animus need not be the intention of an owner: Ihering, Holmes and Salmond say an intention to exclude others is enough, so a bailee, pledgee or tenant possesses. The shopkeeper in Bridges v. Hawkesworth lost because he had neither control of nor intention towards the banknotes on his floor. The 2023-24 paper asked for 'the two main elements of possession as per Savigny' with these cases.

Do not confuse with "council" (a body of persons). "Counsel" is also a verb, to advise, and in criminal law to counsel an offence is to abet it. Sentence: "Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appeal was barred by limitation."

In Hyde v. Wrench (1840) Wrench offered his farm for 1,000 pounds, Hyde said he would give 950, Wrench refused, and Hyde then 'accepted' the 1,000. There was no contract: the 950 counter offer had killed the original offer. Every negotiation that goes back and forth is a chain of counter offers until one side says yes without qualification.

A bus driver forbidden to race who obstructs a rival bus is still in the course of employment (Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 1862); so is a tanker driver who throws a lighted match while unloading petrol (Century Insurance, 1942) and a solicitor's clerk who defrauds a client for himself (Lloyd v. Grace Smith, 1912). A conductor who drives the bus (Beard, 1900), a servant on "a frolic of his own", or a bank employee who takes money privately as a friend (State Bank of India v. Shyama Devi, 1978) is outside it.

A writes to B offering to sell his car for Rs 3 lakh; the same day B writes to A offering to buy that car for Rs 3 lakh. The letters cross in the post. There is no contract, because an acceptance must be made with knowledge of, and in response to, the offer (s. 2(b)); the English case is Tinn v. Hoffman (1873). One of them must now accept the other's letter.

In Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co. (1957) a sign projecting eight inches over a shop was a trespass to its airspace. But in Bernstein v. Skyviews (1978) an aircraft flying several hundred feet above a house to photograph it did not trespass, because the owner's rights reach only as high as the ordinary use of the land requires. Tunnelling under a neighbour's land is trespass to the subsoil.

Before there were legislatures and law reports, people were governed by what had always been done. Salmond calls custom the embodiment of those principles which have commended themselves to the national conscience as principles of justice and public utility. Jurists disagree about when a custom becomes law: Austin says only when the sovereign or the courts adopt it (until then it is positive morality), Savigny says it is law from the start as the expression of the Volksgeist. To be enforced a custom must be ancient, continuous, peaceably enjoyed, certain, consistent, reasonable, not against statute or public policy, and obeyed as of right. Students meet custom in Hindu law (the Ramnad case; s. 3(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955), in trade usages saved by s. 1 of the Contract Act, and in Article 13(3)(a).

Gloucester Grammar School case (1410): a schoolmaster who opened a rival school and drew away pupils was not liable. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1892): a trade combination that ruined a competitor by lawful means caused no legal injury. In India, Ushaben v. Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir (1978) refused an injunction against a film that hurt religious feelings but violated no legal right. Sentence: "The new mall ruined the old shopkeeper's business, but it is damnum sine injuria and gives no cause of action."

The "de facto doctrine" protects acts done by a judge or officer whose appointment is later found defective, so that the public is not harmed (Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P., 1981). Sentence: "Though never formally appointed, she was the de facto manager of the firm and signed all its contracts."

Always paired with de facto. India recognised the new government of Bangladesh de jure in December 1971. In property disputes the question is often whether the de facto possessor or the de jure owner should get relief. Sentence: "The trust remained the de jure owner of the temple land although the tenant had occupied it for decades."

Taken from the English Chancery practice of declaring rights so that a cloud on a person's status or title is removed before it does harm. The relief is discretionary, binds only the parties and those claiming through them (s. 35), and is refused by the proviso where the plaintiff could have asked for further relief such as possession but did not (Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi). Example: 'She obtained a declaratory decree that she was the lawfully adopted daughter and therefore an heir.' Lawyers use it in suits about adoption, marriage, caste status, membership of a society and title to land.

A decree follows the judgment and is drawn up in a set form; it is what is executed. Rejection of a plaint and determination of a question under s. 144 are deemed decrees; an order of dismissal for default is not. A first appeal lies from a decree (s. 96), not from every order. Sentence: "A preliminary decree for partition was passed declaring the shares of the three brothers."

Essentials: the statement must be defamatory, refer to the plaintiff and be published to at least one other person. Indian law does not treat slander differently from libel. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) upheld criminal defamation as a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2). Sentence: "The newspaper's false report that the advocate had been debarred for cheating is defamation."

From Law French defendant, one who defends. The defendant may plead a set-off or counter-claim (Order VIII CPC) and must prove the facts he specially pleads, such as payment or limitation. If he loses he becomes the appellant. Sentence: "The defendant denies that any loan was ever advanced to him."

Deficiency is to services what defect is to goods. A builder's delay in handing over a flat (Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, 1993), a hospital's wrong injection (Spring Meadows Hospital, 1998), a bank wrongly dishonouring a cheque or an insurer rejecting a valid claim are all deficiencies. The 2019 Act added negligence and the deliberate withholding of information to the 1986 definition in s. 2(1)(g).

Parliament has neither the time nor the technical knowledge to write every detail, so it enacts the skeleton and lets ministries, local bodies, universities and the courts fill in the flesh: the Motor Vehicles Rules, the Income-tax Rules, municipal by-laws, Supreme Court Rules under Article 145. Article 13(3)(a) counts every such order, rule, regulation and by-law as "law", so it must respect the fundamental rights. In re Delhi Laws Act (1951) laid down the Indian limit: ancillary powers may be delegated, the determination of policy may not; Hamdard Dawakhana (1960) struck down a rule-making power that came with no guidance. Controls are parliamentary (laying before the House, the Committee on Subordinate Legislation), judicial (ultra vires, unreasonableness, violation of Part III) and procedural (publication and consultation). A Henry VIII clause lets the executive modify the parent Act itself and is viewed with suspicion.

Applies in agency (s. 190 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: an agent cannot delegate acts he has undertaken to perform personally, except by custom or the nature of the agency), in administrative law (a minister or board given a statutory discretion must exercise it itself) and in the law of trusts. In A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab (1986) a Food Inspector's prosecution launched under a sub-delegated authority was held invalid. Sentence: "The Vice-Chancellor could not hand his disciplinary power to a clerk: delegatus non potest delegare."

From "depose", to testify. A false affidavit exposes the deponent to prosecution for giving false evidence (s. 229 BNS; s. 191 IPC). Sentence: "I, the deponent above named, do hereby verify that the contents of paragraphs 1 to 6 are true to my personal knowledge."

Demand and refusal are the heart of detinue: a repairer who keeps your car after you have paid and asked for it detains it wrongfully. England abolished detinue in 1977 and merged it with conversion, but in India the owner can sue for the specific movable property under ss. 7 and 8 of the Specific Relief Act 1963.

The Vedic rita (cosmic order) became dharma, whose sources Manu lists as Shruti, Smriti, the conduct of the good and one's own conscience. Dharma is the Indian form of natural law as virtue: it is not the command of a king (the king is under dharma and punishes through danda only to protect it), it is discovered rather than made, and it speaks of duties before rights. The syllabus asks how the classical approach (the Smritis, the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga), the medieval approach (Islamic law and the Mughal courts) and the modern trends (the Constitution, social justice, PIL, the uniform civil code debate) together make up Indian jurisprudence.

Taylor v. Caldwell (1863): the music hall burnt down before the concerts, and the hirer could not sue. Krell v. Henry (1903): the coronation procession was cancelled, so the room hired to watch it was useless. In Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur (1954) the Supreme Court said the Indian court does not look for an implied term but applies s. 56 as positive law. Commercial hardship, a rise in prices or a self-induced event is not frustration (Davis Contractors, 1956). Section 65 then orders restitution of benefits received.

Roman law protected dominium by the vindicatio (the owner's action to recover his thing) and possessio by the praetor's interdicts, which restored a dispossessed person without inquiring into title. Salmond turns the contrast into his famous line: ownership is the de jure relation, possession the de facto relation between a person and a thing. The 2018-19 paper asked what 'dominium' and 'possessio' mean. Holland's 'plenary control over an object' and Austin's definition of ownership descend from dominium.

Order VI Rule 17 CPC allows amendment after trial begins only if the matter could not have been raised earlier "in spite of due diligence"; a lawyer who fails to verify title before a client buys land has not exercised due diligence and may be guilty of professional misconduct. Sentence: "The director escaped liability by proving that the cheque was dishonoured without his knowledge and despite all due diligence."

Lord Atkin defined it in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932): "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour", that is, persons so closely and directly affected by your act that you ought to have them in mind. A driver owes it to other road users, a doctor to his patient, a manufacturer to the consumer. Caparo v. Dickman (1990) adds that a duty arises where harm is foreseeable, the parties are proximate, and it is fair, just and reasonable to impose it. No duty was owed in Bourhill v. Young (1943) to a woman outside the area of foreseeable danger.

American federal appellate courts sit en banc to resolve conflicts between panels; in India a reference to a larger Bench serves the same purpose (Art. 145(3) requires at least five judges for a substantial question of constitutional law). Sentence: "The conflict between the two Division Bench rulings was referred to a Full Bench, the Indian form of an en banc hearing."

From the Old French estoupail, a stopper. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. (1979) the State, having promised a sales-tax holiday on which the company set up a factory, was held to its promise. There is no estoppel against a statute. Sentence: "Having represented that the agent had authority, the principal is barred by estoppel from denying it."

Governments announce ex gratia relief to victims of floods or accidents; an employer may pay an ex gratia bonus above the statutory one. Accepting an ex gratia payment does not by itself bar a legal claim unless a release is signed. Sentence: "The State sanctioned an ex gratia payment of four lakh rupees to each bereaved family."

A Roman-law maxim adopted by the common law as the doctrine of consideration. 'No consideration, no contract' is the classroom version. Section 25 states the rule and its exceptions: a registered writing out of natural love and affection between near relatives, a promise to compensate past voluntary service, and a written promise to pay a time-barred debt. Abdul Aziz v. Masum Ali (1914) shows the maxim at work: a promise to subscribe to a mosque fund could not be enforced because nothing had been done on the faith of it.

An ex parte decree may be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 CPC if the defendant shows that summons was not duly served or he was prevented by sufficient cause. An ex parte injunction must be followed by notice to the other side (Order XXXIX Rule 3). It is the standing exception to audi alteram partem, justified by necessity. Sentence: "The defendant did not appear despite service, and the suit was decreed ex parte."

Lord Mansfield stated it in Holman v. Johnson (1775): "no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act." A smuggler cannot sue his partner for a share of the profits; a person who pays a bribe cannot recover it. The companion maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis (where both are equally at fault, the defendant's position is stronger) explains why the loss lies where it falls. Sentence: "The claim for the price of smuggled gold was dismissed: ex turpi causa non oritur actio."

In Rookes v. Barnard (1964) Lord Devlin limited them in England to oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by government servants, wrongs calculated to make a profit, and cases authorised by statute. Indian courts award them more freely, especially against the State for violation of fundamental rights (Bhim Singh v. State of J and K, 1985, Rs 50,000 for an MLA's illegal detention). Different from aggravated damages, which compensate injured feelings.

A film critic who writes "the film is three hours of boredom" is protected by fair comment, however harsh, if that is his honest opinion. If he writes "the director stole the script", that is a statement of fact which only proof of truth (justification) can defend. The comment must be on a public matter (government, public servants, books, films, sport) and must not be actuated by malice. The Sixth Exception to s. 356 BNS similarly protects opinions on the merits of a public performance.

"False" means wrongful and "imprisonment" needs no prison: locking someone in a room or keeping him at a police station without legal authority is enough. The restraint must be total; blocking one way while another is open is not imprisonment (Bird v. Jones, 1845). The plaintiff need not know he is detained (Meering v. Grahame-White Aviation, 1919). In India illegal detention by the police is also compensated under Article 32 (Bhim Singh v. State of J&K, 1985). The criminal counterpart is wrongful confinement, BNS s. 127.

In Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. (1957) and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar (1965) the Supreme Court said the maxim is "neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice"; a court must try to disengage the truth from the falsehood (Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, 2003). Sentence: "Defence counsel urged falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, but the court accepted the part of the eyewitness's account that the medical evidence supported."

The FIR is not substantive evidence but corroborates or contradicts the informant; a copy must be given free to the informant and, now, uploaded online. Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. (2014) held registration mandatory when the information discloses a cognizable offence; the BNSS permits a preliminary enquiry for offences punishable with three to seven years. Sentence: "The FIR was lodged within an hour of the robbery and named all three accused."

The Constitution Bench in National Insurance v. Pranay Sethi (2017) fixed it: for a permanent job 50% below 40 years, 30% for 40-50 and 15% for 50-60; for the self-employed or those on a fixed salary 40%, 25% and 10%. Example: a 35-year-old government clerk earning Rs 30,000 a month is treated as earning Rs 45,000 for computing the loss of dependency.

Also called "justification in tort". When the plaintiff proves every element of a tort, the defendant may still escape by proving one of these defences. For example, a doctor who operates with consent (volenti), a farmer whose lake bursts in an unprecedented flood (act of God, Nichols v. Marsland) or a judge who decides a case honestly (judicial immunity, Sirros v. Moore) is not liable. Specific defences such as fair comment in defamation or prescription in nuisance belong to one tort only.

Most road deaths can be prevented if the injured person is treated within the first hour. Since 2019 insurers must provide for treatment of accident victims including in the golden hour, and the Central Government must frame a scheme of cashless treatment (s. 162), paid from the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (s. 164B(3)(a)). Doctors must attend at once without waiting for formalities (s. 134(a)), as the Supreme Court held in Parmanand Katara v. Union of India (1989).

The name comes from the parable of the Good Samaritan who helped a wounded stranger. A Good Samaritan is not liable to any civil or criminal action for injury or death of the victim caused by his negligence while helping (s. 134A). The protection began with guidelines made binding by the Supreme Court in Savelife Foundation v. Union of India (2016): he may leave after taking the victim to hospital, need not disclose his identity and cannot be asked to pay. Example: a passer-by who lifts an injured motorcyclist into his car and drives him to hospital.

Every norm is valid because a higher norm authorises it: a municipal bye-law because of a statute, the statute because of the Constitution. The chain must stop somewhere, and Kelsen stops it with a hypothesis that jurists must presuppose, the Grundnorm, which is neither valid nor invalid but assumed, and which changes when a revolution makes a new order effective. Indian courts have described the Constitution as the Grundnorm of the Indian legal system; Kesavananda Bharati shows the Court guarding its basic structure. Compare Hart's rule of recognition, which is a social fact, not a presupposition.

The oldest and most important writ for personal liberty, available against the State and against private persons (a husband or parent confining a woman); any person may move it on the detainee's behalf. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976), which suspended it during the Emergency, is now treated as wrongly decided (K.S. Puttaswamy, 2017). Sentence: "The mother filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that her son had been kept in police custody for five days without being produced before a magistrate."

The device by which a finance company keeps ownership of a car or machine until the last instalment. The leading contrast is between Lee v. Butler (1893), where the hirer was bound to buy and so was a buyer in possession who could pass title, and Helby v. Matthews (1895), where the hirer could return the piano at any time, had only an option, and could not pass title to a pledgee. Indian law follows Helby v. Matthews; the Hire-Purchase Act 1972 was passed but never brought into force, so the Contract Act's rules on bailment and the general law govern. Example: 'The vehicle was under hire-purchase, so the financier could repossess it on default.' Lawyers meet it in vehicle finance and repossession disputes.

Because there is no identified owner or insurer, the victim cannot bring an ordinary claim. The Act therefore pays a fixed sum from the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund: Rs 2 lakh for death and Rs 50,000 for grievous hurt (s. 161, scheme of 2022), refundable out of any later award if the vehicle is traced (s. 163). Example: a cyclist killed at night by a truck that escapes untraced. The test is the identity of the vehicle, not the driver; escaping after causing death is also an offence under BNS s. 106(2).

Hohfeld showed that the word 'right' hides four different relations. A claim-right (I may demand that you pay) correlates with your duty; a privilege or liberty (I may walk on my land) correlates with your no-right to stop me; a power (I may make a will, accept an offer) correlates with your liability to have your position changed; an immunity (the President under Article 361) correlates with the other side's disability. Each conception also has an opposite: the opposite of a right is a no-right, of a privilege a duty, of a power a disability, of an immunity a liability. Examiners ask for 'the chart' of these relations with an example for each pair.

Embodied in ss. 14 and 17 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (ss. 76 and 79 IPC): a soldier who fires on a mob on the order of his superior, or a man who in good faith seizes a person he believes to be a murderer, commits no offence. Contrast R. v. Prince (1875), where a mistake about a girl's age did not excuse because the act was in itself wrong. Sentence: "The police officer who arrested the twin brother by an honest mistake of identity is protected by ignorantia facti excusat."

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (ss. 14 and 17, following ss. 76 and 79 IPC) excuses a mistake of fact made in good faith but never a mistake of law. In State of Maharashtra v. M.H. George (1965) a traveller who did not know of an RBI notification restricting gold was still liable. The Supreme Court has observed (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., 1979) that the maxim is a rule of policy, not a factual presumption. Sentence: "The driver's plea that he did not know the new speed limit fails: ignorantia juris non excusat."

Salmond calls immunity "exemption from the power of another" and Paton "freedom from the power of control of another". A citizen is immune from Parliament abridging his fundamental rights by ordinary law (Article 13); a member of Parliament is immune from any court for what he says in the House (Article 105); a judge is immune from prosecution for an act done judicially in good faith (s. 15 BNS); a foreign diplomat is immune from the local courts; the general exceptions in ss. 14-44 BNS immunise the infant, the insane and the person acting in private defence from criminal liability. Immunity differs from privilege (a liberty to act, with no correlative duty in others) and from exemption (relief from a burden such as a tax). Its tendency in modern law is to shrink, as sovereign immunity has.

The general rule is open justice; in camera proceedings are an exception to protect the victim, a child, State secrets or the privacy of the parties. Publication of what happens in camera without the court's permission is punishable. Sentence: "The court directed that the prosecutrix be examined in camera and that her name not be published."

A person is indigent if, apart from exempt property and the subject matter of the suit, he cannot pay the fee prescribed for the plaint (or, where none is prescribed, is not worth one thousand rupees). The court inquires into the application; if the plaintiff wins, the fee is recovered from the defendant. Sentence: "The widow filed her suit for maintenance in forma pauperis as she could not pay the court fee."

At common law a teacher in loco parentis could use moderate correction for the child's welfare, including for misconduct outside school that affected school discipline (Cleary v. Booth, 1893). He also owes the child the care a reasonable parent would take. In India the power to inflict physical punishment has been taken away by s. 17 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009, so the teacher's quasi-parental authority today means reasonable control and supervision without physical punishment or mental harassment.

The maxim is the companion of ex turpi causa non oritur actio. It began in contract (an agreement with an unlawful object is void, Indian Contract Act s. 23, and money paid under it is usually not recoverable) and is applied in tort to joint illegal enterprises. In Pitts v. Hunt (1991) a pillion passenger who encouraged his unlicensed, drunk friend to ride recklessly could not sue when they crashed. The maxim does not apply where the parties are not equally at fault, for example where the law that was broken was meant to protect the plaintiff.

Contract gives rights in personam (against the promisor only); ownership gives rights in rem. An ordinary decree for money binds only the judgment-debtor. Sentence: "A tenant's right under the lease is a right in personam against the landlord, not against the world."

A judgment in rem determines status: once a court grants probate of a will, everyone is bound to treat the executor as such. Sentence: "A decree of nullity of marriage operates in rem and binds even strangers to the suit."

In Stanley v. Powell (1891) a pellet fired at a pheasant glanced off an oak tree and hit a member of the shooting party; the shooter, who was not careless, was not liable. In Brown v. Kendall (1850) a man separating fighting dogs with a stick hit the plaintiff in the eye while stepping back; no liability. Unlike an act of God, an inevitable accident may involve human agency, and it is not a defence to strict liability under Rylands v. Fletcher. The criminal parallel is BNS s. 18 (IPC s. 80).

The three tests for a temporary injunction: a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. Disobedience is punishable by attachment of property or detention (Order XXXIX Rule 2A). Sentence: "The court granted a temporary injunction restraining the builder from demolishing the boundary wall."

Ashby v. White (1703): the returning officer who refused a qualified voter's vote was liable though the voter's candidate won. Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985): a legislator detained illegally and kept from the Assembly session was awarded Rs. 50,000 though he proved no monetary loss. Sentence: "Walking across another's field without permission is actionable trespass, an injuria sine damno, even if not a blade of grass is harmed."

"Mr X was seen entering house no. 12 last night" is harmless to most readers, but defamatory to neighbours who know that house no. 12 is a gambling den. In Tolley v. Fry (1931) an advertisement showing an amateur golfer with a chocolate bar implied that he had been paid for it; in Cassidy v. Daily Mirror (1929) a photograph announcing a man's engagement implied, to those who knew his wife, that she was living with him unmarried. Both were held defamatory by innuendo.

A drafting convenience, not a rule of law. The related inter se means "between themselves" (the rights of the partners inter se). Sentence: "The petition challenges, inter alia, the constitution of the selection committee."

From Latin in (not) + testatus (having made a will). A person may die partly intestate if the will does not dispose of all his property. Sentence: "As Mr. Sharma died intestate, his house was divided equally among his widow, son and daughter as Class I heirs."

When a State law is challenged, the court first asks whether it is intra vires the State List or the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. Sentence: "The rules were held intra vires as s. 30 of the Act expressly authorised the Government to make them."

The phrase comes from English contract law: to 'treat' is to negotiate, so an invitation to treat invites bargaining. In Harvey v. Facey (1893) a telegram quoting the lowest price for Bumper Hall Pen was only an invitation; in Pharmaceutical Society v. Boots (1953) goods on the self-service shelf were an invitation and the customer made the offer at the till. A lawyer meets the idea whenever a client says 'but the advertisement promised it'.

Compare ipso jure, "by the law itself". Sentence: "Adjudication as an insolvent does not ipso facto dissolve the partnership unless the deed so provides."

If two men together beat a third, or a master is liable for his driver's careless driving, they are joint tortfeasors. The victim may sue any or all of them and recover the whole loss from any one, but cannot recover more than his total loss. The old common-law rules that a judgment against one barred the others and that there was no contribution between them (Merryweather v. Nixan, 1799) were abolished in England by statute; Indian courts allow contribution on justice, equity and good conscience. Different from several concurrent tortfeasors, whose separate wrongs combine to cause one damage.

Spelt "judgment" in legal English (not "judgement"). It is pronounced in open court; the decree is drawn up afterwards in accordance with it. The ratio decidendi is found in the judgment. Sentence: "The judgment was reserved after arguments and pronounced a week later."

The immunity protects judicial independence: in Sirros v. Moore (1975) Lord Denning said a judge should not have to turn the pages of his books "with trembling fingers". In India, s. 1 of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act 1850 protects acts done in the discharge of judicial duty whether or not within jurisdiction if the officer in good faith believed he had jurisdiction (Anwar Hussain v. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, 1965); s. 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act 1985 bars civil and criminal proceedings. The criminal exceptions are BNS ss. 15 and 16 (IPC ss. 77 and 78). An erring judge is corrected by appeal, not by a suit for damages.

Pound set out the five postulates in 1919 (printed in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 1922) as the measure by which a lawmaker tests which interests to recognise. Each has a home in Indian law: the offences against the person in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (no aggression), Article 300A and the property statutes (control of what one has acquired), the Contract Act's rules on performance and quasi-contract (good faith), the law of negligence and section 106 BNS (due care), and the rule of absolute liability in M.C. Mehta and the Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 (dangerous things kept in bounds). The 2023-24 paper asked for exactly this list with Indian examples.

From the Latin juris prudentia, "knowledge of law". Ulpian called it "the knowledge of things divine and human, the science of the just and the unjust"; Austin "the philosophy of positive law"; Holland "the formal science of positive law"; Salmond "the science of the first principles of the civil law". Where a contract course asks what a valid offer is, jurisprudence asks what a right is, where law comes from and whether an unjust law is law at all. Indian textbooks call it "the eye of law" because it lets the lawyer see the whole legal system and not just its parts. LL.B. students meet it in the first semester as the paper that introduces the schools of law (analytical, natural, historical, sociological, realist), the sources of law and the basic legal concepts.

In Davies v. Mann (1842) a man left his fettered donkey on the road and a wagon driven too fast killed it; because the wagon driver could still have avoided the donkey, he paid in full. In British Columbia Electric Railway v. Loach (1916) a railway whose tram could not stop because of its own defective brakes was treated as having had the last opportunity ("constructive last opportunity"). The rule was replaced by apportionment of damages (Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945) and is now of historical interest in India too.

Duties are positive (to do: pay the price, maintain a child) or negative (to abstain: do not trespass, do not defame), primary (existing independently, such as not to injure) or secondary (arising from the breach of a primary duty, such as to pay damages), relative (owed to a determinate person) or absolute (Austin's duties with no correlative right, such as duties to the sovereign or to the public). Salmond denies absolute duties and holds every duty correlative to a right. Article 51A lists the fundamental duties of citizens, which are not enforceable by any court but guide interpretation.

A notice gives the other side a chance to settle, fixes the date of the dispute and is later proof of demand. In ordinary legal English "notice" also means knowledge ("a purchaser with notice of the earlier sale"). Sentence: "A legal notice was served on the tenant calling upon him to vacate within thirty days."

The word comes from persona, the actor's mask: a person is a role the law recognises, not a biological fact. A company (Salomon v. Salomon), a Hindu idol (Pramatha Nath Mullick), the Guru Granth Sahib (SGPC v. Som Nath Dass) and the Union and the States (Article 300) are persons; an unborn child is treated as a person for its benefit; the dead, animals and rivers are not persons, though the law protects interests connected with them. The theories of corporate personality (fiction, concession, realist, bracket, purpose) try to explain how a group becomes one person.

Bentham and Austin founded the analytical or positivist school in nineteenth-century England; Kelsen's pure theory and Hart's rule theory are its twentieth-century forms. The positivist studies law as it is, separates it from morality and finds its source in a sovereign, a basic norm or a rule of recognition rather than in reason or God. The Emergency-era decision in A.D.M. Jabalpur, where the majority held that liberty was 'the gift of the law', is the Indian illustration of positivism at its strictest; Justice Khanna's dissent is the natural-law answer.

The realists asked the 'bad man's' question: not what the law ought to be, nor even what the statute says, but what will happen to me in court. Gray said statutes are only sources until a court interprets them; Llewellyn distrusted 'paper rules' (rule-scepticism); Frank doubted even the finding of facts (fact-scepticism). In India Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding, and Vishaka, where the Court wrote the rules against sexual harassment because Parliament had not, shows judges as lawmakers. Critics (Hart, Goodhart, Dias) answer that courts decide by rules, and that most law works without any court at all.

The will theory (Austin, Holland, Kant) sees a right as a power of the holder's will which the State enforces; the interest theory (Ihering, Salmond) sees it as an interest the law protects. Salmond's five elements are the person of inherence, the person of incidence, the content, the object and the title. A student meets the term in Part III of the Constitution (fundamental rights enforceable under Article 32), in the Contract Act (the promisee's right in personam) and in every classification of rights: perfect and imperfect, in rem and in personam, proprietary and personal, vested and contingent.

A legal word is any word used in legal writing; a legal term has a settled definition, usually in a statute (s. 2 of the CPC, s. 2 of the BNS) or in case law. "Consideration" means thoughtfulness in ordinary English but "something in return" in s. 2(d) of the Contract Act. Sentence: ""Convicted" is a legal term: it means found guilty, not punished."

From the Latin legis latum, the making of law. Gray calls legislation the formal utterances of the legislative organs of the society, and Austin says there can be no law without a legislative act. It is the chief modern source because it can repeal as well as create (abrogative power), operates prospectively, is written in a definite form and is made by a body answerable to the people. Supreme legislation in India is made by Parliament and the State Legislatures within the limits of the Constitution (Articles 245-246); subordinate legislation includes executive rules, court rules, municipal by-laws, the regulations of autonomous bodies and, historically, colonial legislation. Compare custom (unwritten, slow, from the people) and precedent (retrospective, tied to the facts of a dispute). Codification, such as the Indian Contract Act 1872 or the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, is legislation that restates a whole branch of the law.

Liability is what happens on the far side of a duty: break the duty and the law binds you to a remedy. Markby calls it the condition of a person who has a duty to perform; Austin prefers "imputability", the quality of being answerable for an act. It is civil (compensation, injunction, specific performance) or criminal (punishment), remedial or penal (Salmond), fault-based or strict and absolute (Rylands v. Fletcher; M.C. Mehta), personal or vicarious (a master for a servant, the State under Article 300). Hohfeld uses the word in a narrower sense, as the correlative of a power. A student meets the term in the first lecture of Unit V and in every tort and criminal law answer that asks "who is liable, and why?".

English law divides defamation into libel and slander by its form. A newspaper report, a cartoon, a social-media post or a film is libel; words spoken at a meeting are slander. Libel is treated as more serious because it lasts and spreads, so damage to reputation is presumed. In Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (1934) a talking film suggesting that a princess had been ravished by Rasputin was held to be libel. In India criminal defamation (s. 356 BNS) does not distinguish the two forms.

English law draws a sharp line: liquidated damages are recoverable as fixed, a penalty is unenforceable (Dunlop v. New Garage, 1915). Section 74 abolishes the distinction for India: the court awards reasonable compensation up to the stipulated sum in either case (Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Das, 1963; Maula Bux v. Union of India, 1970; ONGC v. Saw Pipes, 2003). Delay clauses in construction contracts and forfeiture of earnest money are the everyday battlegrounds.

The maxim pendente lite nihil innovetur (nothing new should be introduced while litigation is pending) explains it: otherwise a defendant could defeat every decree by selling the property mid-suit. The transfer is not void but subordinate to the decree. Sentence: "The sale made during the partition suit is hit by lis pendens and binds the buyer to the final decree."

Ehrlich, a professor in Czernowitz (Bukovina), noticed that the many communities of his province lived by their own customs which the Austrian Civil Code never reached. The living law is found by observing how people actually behave, not by reading statutes; the State's law is only one layer on top of it. Pound's 'law in action' and the realists' interest in what courts actually do grew from the same insight. Critics say Ehrlich blurs the line between law and social habit and leaves no test for which social rules are legal.

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) held that any member of the public acting bona fide may move the court for a person or class unable to do so because of poverty or disability; a letter can be treated as a writ petition (epistolary jurisdiction). Busybodies and meddlesome interlopers are still refused. Sentence: "A stranger to the contract has no locus standi to sue for its breach."

It is the income of the deceased plus future prospects, less what he would have spent on himself, converted into a lump sum by the multiplier method. Only those actually dependent share it, though any legal representative may apply (Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai, 1987). Conventional heads (loss of estate, consortium, funeral expenses) are added separately (Pranay Sethi, 2017). Example: the widow and children of a salaried man killed in an accident.

From Latin magistratus, a public officer. An arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within twenty-four hours (Art. 22(2)). A Judicial Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of up to three years and a fine up to fifty thousand rupees (s. 23 BNSS). Sentence: "The magistrate remanded the accused to judicial custody for fourteen days."

Courts distinguish "malice in fact" (personal ill-will) from "malice in law" (use of a power for an unauthorised purpose). Transfers of government servants made to punish them have been struck down as mala fide. Sentence: "The petitioner alleges that the transfer order was passed mala fide, to punish him for testifying against the Collector."

The plaintiff must prove five things: the defendant prosecuted him; the prosecution ended in his favour; there was no reasonable and probable cause; the defendant acted with malice; and he suffered damage to reputation, person or property. In Mohammad Amin v. Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee (1947) a complaint dismissed after a preliminary inquiry was enough because it caused damage. The criminal counterpart is a false charge, BNS s. 248 (IPC s. 211).

The petitioner must show a legal right to the performance of the duty and a demand followed by refusal. A municipality that refuses to issue a licence the applicant is entitled to, or a university that withholds a degree, can be commanded by mandamus. Sentence: "The High Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the Board to declare the petitioner's result within two weeks."

Most injunctions forbid; a mandatory injunction commands. Equity developed it for cases where a wrong had already been done and only undoing it would prevent its continuance, for instance removing an encroachment on the plaintiff's land. It is granted sparingly, and at the interim stage only on a strong case (Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden). Example: 'The court issued a mandatory injunction directing the builder to demolish the floor built in breach of the sanctioned plan.' A lawyer pleads it with a prohibitory injunction when the defendant has already started the wrong.

Blackstone described mayhem as violently depriving another of the use of such of his members as may render him less able in fighting, such as an arm, a leg, an eye or a front tooth. It was a felony at common law and a tort attracting heavy damages. Indian law does not use the word; the heads of grievous hurt in s. 116 BNS (IPC s. 320), such as loss of a member or joint, permanent loss of sight or hearing, and fracture of a bone or tooth, cover the same ground.

From the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The difference between murder (s. 101 BNS) and culpable homicide (s. 100) lies in the degree of intention or knowledge; death by a rash or negligent act (s. 106) needs only negligence. Strict-liability offences (food adulteration, foreign exchange) dispense with it for public welfare (State of Maharashtra v. M.H. George, 1965). Sentence: "The prosecution must prove mens rea: that the accused knew the note was forged when he passed it."

A health drink advertised as making children 'taller in a month', or a coaching institute advertising toppers who never studied there, is a misleading advertisement. The Central Consumer Protection Authority can order it withdrawn and fine the manufacturer or endorser up to Rs 10 lakh (Rs 50 lakh for repeats) and bar the endorser for up to one year (three for repeats), unless the endorser shows due diligence (s. 21); the manufacturer can also be prosecuted (s. 89). A Commission may order a corrective advertisement (s. 39(1)(l)).

Its members are or have been High Court or District Judges (s. 165(3)). It hears claims by the injured, owners of property, legal representatives or agents (s. 166), uses summary procedure with civil court powers (s. 169), awards just compensation (s. 168) with interest (s. 171), and its awards are appealable to the High Court within ninety days (s. 173). Civil courts are barred (s. 175). Example: a widow files her claim before the MACT of the district where she lives (s. 166(2)).

The multiplier represents the years of support lost, discounted because the family receives a lump sum at once. Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) gave the table (18 up to age 25, falling to 5 above 65) and the deductions for personal expenses (one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth, one-half for a bachelor), approved in Reshma Kumari (2013); Pranay Sethi (2017) fixed future prospects. Example: Rs 3,60,000 annual dependency of a 35-year-old x 16 = Rs 57,60,000.

Natural justice is the natural-law school's lasting gift to procedure: rules of fairness so basic that they are read into every statute unless expressly excluded. Salmond contrasts "justice according to law", the justice a court must do by applying the law of the land, with natural justice, the fairness of the process by which it is done. In India the principles were made part of Article 14 and Article 21 by Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978): a procedure that deprives a person of life or liberty must be "fair, just and reasonable", which means it must give a hearing. A.K. Kraipak (1969) applied them to administrative decisions; dismissals, disciplinary inquiries, licence cancellations and university examinations are the everyday battlegrounds. The principles yield to statute, emergency and the impossibility of a hearing, but a breach ordinarily makes the decision void.

From Aristotle's justice by nature and Cicero's right reason, through Aquinas's four kinds of law and the social contract writers (Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), to Fuller's inner morality of law and Finnis's basic goods, natural lawyers have asked what law ought to be. The positivists (Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, Hart) separated that question from what law is. A student meets natural law in the fundamental rights, in Maneka Gandhi's demand that a procedure be fair, just and reasonable, in the basic structure doctrine and in the principles of natural justice.

Not 'necessities': necessaries is a term of art and depends on the person's station. Nash v. Inman (1908): eleven fancy waistcoats supplied to a Cambridge undergraduate who was already well supplied were not necessaries, so the tailor failed. In India money lent for a minor's sister's marriage and a house rented for a minor to live in while studying have been held necessaries. Only the minor's property is liable, never the minor personally, and the supplier recovers a reasonable price, not the agreed one. The word also appears in s. 68's illustrations about a lunatic and his family.

Pulling down a house to stop a fire spreading through a town (public necessity) or burning a fire break on a neighbour's heath to save one's own land (private necessity, Cope v. Sharpe, 1912) is excused. Forcible feeding of a prisoner on hunger strike was justified in Leigh v. Gladstone (1909). The defence is narrow: in Kirk v. Gregory (1876) moving a dead man's jewellery to another room, where it was stolen, was unnecessary and a trespass; in Southwark LBC v. Williams (1971) homelessness was no defence to trespass. The criminal parallel is BNS s. 19 (IPC s. 81).

Negligence is the second form of mens rea after intention: the harm is not wanted, but the wrongdoer did not take the care the law demands. Two theories compete. The subjective theory (Austin, Salmond, early Winfield) treats it as a state of mind, inadvertence or indifference; the objective theory (Pollock, Holmes) treats it as conduct falling below the standard of the reasonable man, which is what courts actually test. As a tort it needs a duty of care (Donoghue v. Stevenson, the neighbour principle), its breach and resulting damage. In criminal law only gross negligence is punished (s. 106 BNS, Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab). A student meets it in Unit V and again in every Torts lecture.

A Roman law maxim that protects owners against thieves and faithless bailees: a buyer from a non-owner, however honest, generally gets nothing. Commerce needs exceptions, and the Act provides them: sale by a person whose authority the owner is estopped from denying, sale by a mercantile agent in possession with consent (s. 27 proviso), sale by one of joint owners (s. 28), sale under a voidable title before it is avoided (s. 29), sale by a seller or buyer in possession after sale (s. 30), and sales under statutory powers and in market overt-type situations. Example: 'The car had been stolen, so the dealer's buyer got no title: nemo dat quod non habet.' Lawyers meet it in disputes over stolen vehicles and double sales.

The rule against double jeopardy. In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay (1953) confiscation of gold by customs authorities was held not to be a "prosecution" by a court, so a later criminal trial was not barred; Art. 20(2) applies only where the earlier proceeding was before a court or judicial tribunal and ended in conviction or acquittal. Sentence: "Having been acquitted of the theft, he cannot be tried again on the same facts: nemo debet bis vexari."

Coke invoked it in Dr Bonham's case (1610); in Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852) the Lord Chancellor's decree was set aside because he held shares in the company. In India A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) quashed selections in which a candidate sat on the selection board. The test is a "real likelihood" or "reasonable apprehension" of bias; actual bias need not be proved, for justice must also be seen to be done. Sentence: "The principal who was himself the complainant could not sit on the disciplinary committee: nemo judex in causa sua."

Early law refused recovery without impact (Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 1888), but Dulieu v. White (1901) allowed it for fear for oneself and Hambrook v. Stokes (1925) for fear for one's children seen with one's own eyes. A bystander out of danger cannot usually recover (Bourhill v. Young, 1943). Relatives who witness an accident or its immediate aftermath must satisfy the control mechanisms of Alcock (1992). Modern judges call it "psychiatric injury".

After Minu B. Mehta (1977) required proof of negligence, Parliament added no-fault liability: s. 92A (1982), s. 140 (Rs 50,000 / Rs 25,000) and s. 163A (structured formula), all replaced in 2019 by s. 164. If the claimant accepts s. 164 compensation through the insurer's settlement (s. 149), his fault-based claim under s. 166 lapses. Example: the family of a passenger killed when a bus overturns for no proven reason receives Rs 5 lakh without proving negligence.

An old common-law plea for the blind and illiterate, narrowed in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society (1971) to mistakes about the fundamental nature of the document, not merely its contents. In Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh (1990) an illiterate woman who thought she was signing a gift deed in favour of her daughter, but was made to sign a sale deed, was held not bound: the transaction was void, not merely voidable. Distinguish it from fraud as to the terms, which only makes the contract voidable under s. 19.

From the Latin novare, to make new. The illustration to s. 62: A owes B Rs 10,000; A, B and C agree that C will pay B instead, and the old debt is at an end. Scarf v. Jardine (1882) explains the two kinds: a new contract between the same parties, or a new party in place of an old one. Novation needs a valid new contract; if the new one is void, the old one revives. Lawyers see it when a firm changes partners or a borrower is replaced in a loan.

In Scott v. Shepherd (1773) a lighted squib thrown into a market was tossed on twice by frightened stall-holders before it blinded the plaintiff; their instinctive throws were not a novus actus, so the first thrower was liable. A rescuer's act is not a novus actus either (Haynes v. Harwood, 1935). But if a thief deliberately exploits a situation the defendant created and the theft was not foreseeable, the chain may be broken.

Contrast ratio decidendi, the reason for the decision, which binds. A judge who decides a tenancy dispute and adds what he would have held had the lease been oral speaks obiter. Sentence: "The remarks on the validity of the ordinance were obiter dicta, as the petition was dismissed on the ground of delay."

The word also names the chapters of the First Schedule to the CPC (Order VII, Order XXXIX) and means any direction of a court or authority. A decree decides rights finally; an order usually regulates the proceeding. Sentence: "The court passed an order restraining the defendant from alienating the property till the next date."

Ownership is a bundle of rights: to possess, to use and enjoy, to manage, to the income, to the capital (to alienate or destroy), with no fixed term and a residuary character (Honore's incidents). It is acquired originally (occupation of a res nullius, accession, specification) or derivatively (purchase, gift, inheritance, prescription). Kinds: corporeal and incorporeal, sole and co-ownership, trust and beneficial, legal and equitable, vested and contingent, absolute and limited. In India Article 300A protects property from deprivation save by authority of law, and s. 110 of the Evidence Act (now in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) presumes the possessor to be the owner.

The maxim of Roman and canon law that became the foundation of both contract law and the law of treaties (Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). It explains why courts are slow to release a party on grounds of hardship: a contract is not frustrated merely because it has become onerous (Davis Contractors, 1956). The doctrine of frustration in s. 56 and the vitiating factors in ss. 14-22 are the recognised exceptions to the sanctity of contract.

Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 lists which debts rank equally. A "pari passu charge" is a security shared equally between lenders. Sentence: "The two banks hold a pari passu charge over the factory."

It keeps the victim out of the contractual dispute between insurer and owner. Example: the driver had a fake licence and the insurer proves the owner's lack of care; the insurer still pays the widow and recovers from the owner. Laid down in National Insurance v. Swaran Singh (2004) and applied to gratuitous passengers in National Insurance v. Baljit Kaur (2004).

Stare decisis assumes that the court knew the law it was applying. If a bench overlooked an Act of Parliament or a decision it was bound to follow, and would have decided differently had it seen it, the decision is per incuriam and later courts may ignore it. The rule comes from Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. (1944), where the English Court of Appeal listed the exceptions to its being bound by itself; Salmond lists ignorance of statute among the circumstances destroying the binding force of a precedent. In India the Supreme Court applied the rule in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) and explained it in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals (1991). It is a narrow rule: a decision is not per incuriam merely because it is wrong or because an argument was not raised.

Also used in judgments to isolate one factor: "delay per se is not a ground to refuse relief." Sentence: "Possession of a knife is not an offence per se; it becomes one when the knife is carried with intent to cause hurt."

The final form of preventive relief, as opposed to a temporary injunction that only holds the position until the suit is decided. Section 38 allows it to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in the plaintiff's favour, and, where property rights are invaded, where the defendant is a trustee, where there is no standard for measuring the damage, where money would not be adequate, or to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Example: 'The decree granted a perpetual injunction restraining the neighbour from blocking the plaintiff's right of way.' It is the usual relief in suits to protect possession, easements and trade marks.

The other side is the respondent. In public interest litigation the petitioner need not be the person wronged. Sentence: "The petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to release her pension."

A plaint that discloses no cause of action, is undervalued or is insufficiently stamped may be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. The criminal counterpart is the complaint; the writ counterpart, the petition. Sentence: "The plaint was returned for presentation to the court within whose jurisdiction the property lies."

From Law French plaintif, one who complains. The plaintiff has the right to begin and must prove the facts on which his claim rests (ss. 104-105 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023). In a writ petition the corresponding party is the petitioner; in a criminal case, the complainant or the State. Sentence: "The plaintiff prays for a decree of Rs. 2,00,000 with interest and costs."

Chemical units at Bichhri village in Rajasthan that poisoned wells and soil with toxic sludge were made to pay for cleaning them up as well as compensating villagers. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum (1996) held the principle, with the precautionary principle, to be part of the law of the land, and the NGT Act 2010 (s. 20) requires the Tribunal to apply it. It builds on the absolute liability of hazardous enterprises laid down in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987).

'Possession is nine points of the law': the possessor is presumed to be the owner, is protected against everyone except a person with a better title (Armory v. Delamirie, s. 6 of the Specific Relief Act) and may ripen into ownership by adverse possession. Kinds: possession in fact and in law, immediate and mediate, corporeal and incorporeal, concurrent, constructive and adverse. It is acquired by taking, by delivery (actual or constructive) or by operation of law. The finder cases (Bridges v. Hawkesworth, South Staffordshire Water v. Sharman, Hannah v. Peel) test the two elements, and s. 303 BNS defines theft as moving property 'out of the possession' of any person.

Gray says a precedent covers everything said or done which furnishes a rule for subsequent practice; Salmond distinguishes the loose sense (any earlier decision) from the strict sense (a decision that lays down a principle). Only the ratio decidendi binds; obiter dicta persuade. Precedents are original (laying down a new rule) or declaratory, authoritative (absolutely or conditionally) or persuasive. A precedent loses its force by overruling, reversal, a later statute, per incuriam, sub silentio or distinguishing. In India the Supreme Court is not bound by its own decisions (Bengal Immunity, 1955) but departs from them only for compelling reasons (Keshav Mills, 1965; Raghubir Singh, 1989). Whether judges "make" or merely "declare" law is the standard exam debate, with Vishaka (1997) and Article 142 as the Indian examples of judicial law-making.

The first test for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX CPC is a prima facie case (with balance of convenience and irreparable injury); a charge is framed when the material discloses a prima facie case; a document is prima facie evidence when it proves a fact until the contrary is shown. Sentence: "The plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of trespass, so an interim injunction is granted."

'Do not steal' and 'pay your taxes' are primary rules. The rules that tell us which rules count as law (recognition), how rules are made and repealed (change) and who decides whether a rule has been broken (adjudication) are secondary rules. Hart called the union of the two 'the key to the science of jurisprudence' and used it to replace Austin's command with the idea of a rule accepted from the internal point of view. In India Article 13 (what is 'law'), Article 368 (how the Constitution changes) and Articles 32, 124 and 226 (who adjudicates) are the secondary rules of the constitutional order.

A person attacked may defend himself without waiting to be struck, but only with force proportionate to the threat, and not after the danger has passed. In Collins v. Renison (1754) throwing a man off a ladder to protect land was excessive; in Bird v. Holbrook (1828) and Ramanuja Mudali v. M. Gangan (1984) owners who protected property with a hidden spring gun and an unmarked live wire were liable to the trespassers they injured. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita sets out the criminal-law right in ss. 34-44 (IPC ss. 96-106).

Fumes from a smelting works that kill a neighbour's trees (St Helen's Smelting v. Tipping, 1865), the noise of a flour mill next to a house (Radhey Shyam v. Gur Prasad Sharma, Allahabad 1978) and dust from a brick-grinding machine entering a doctor's clinic (Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal, 1982) are private nuisances. The interference must be unreasonable, judged by locality, duration, sensitivity and motive; coming to the nuisance is no defence (Sturges v. Bridgman, 1879). The usual remedy is an injunction.

'Privity' means being a party. Dunlop v. Selfridge (1915) and Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) are the English pillars; in India, Jamna Das v. Ram Autar (1912) and M.C. Chacko (1970) apply the rule, while Chinnaya v. Ramayya (1882) shows that the consideration may move from a third person. Exceptions: beneficiary under a trust or charge, family arrangements, estoppel, agency, covenants running with land. A client who is 'the person the contract was meant to help' but did not sign it meets this rule first.

Usually shortened to "pro bono". The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 set up NALSA to give effect to Art. 39A, and the Department of Justice's "Nyaya Bandhu" scheme registers advocates willing to appear pro bono; such work now counts in the designation of senior advocates. Sentence: "The senior advocate appeared pro bono publico for the evicted slum dwellers."

If a pressure cooker bursts on first use because of a faulty valve and injures the buyer, the manufacturer must compensate her for the injury and the damage to her kitchen even if it proves it was careful (s. 84(2)). A seller answers only in the cases in s. 86 (for example, when the maker cannot be traced), and s. 87 gives defences such as misuse and obvious dangers. The idea grew from Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), which let the ultimate consumer sue the manufacturer for negligence; the 2019 Act removes the need to prove negligence.

From Latin prohibere, to forbid. If a civil court begins to try a matter that a statute reserves to a tribunal, the High Court may issue prohibition. The term also means, in ordinary legal English, a statutory ban ("the prohibition on sale of liquor"). Sentence: "A writ of prohibition restrained the Executive Magistrate from trying an offence only a Judicial Magistrate could try."

The feminine of "prosecutor". Modern judgments and the BNSS prefer "victim" or "survivor", but "prosecutrix" is still common in charge-sheets and judgments. Sentence: "The prosecutrix was examined in camera and her statement was recorded by a woman magistrate."

Ordinarily an overruling is retrospective: the law is deemed always to have been what the court now says, which is why Bentham called case law "dog law". American judges (Cardozo in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil, 1932; the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 1965) answered the problem by announcing a new rule for the future only. Subba Rao CJ borrowed the device in Golaknath: Parliament could not amend the fundamental rights, but the three amendments already made would stand. He attached three conditions: only in constitutional matters, only by the Supreme Court, and with discretion to fix the extent of the prospective effect. Later cases such as Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) extended it to statutory questions. Critics say it contradicts the declaratory theory and makes judges legislators; supporters say it avoids chaos when a settled rule is changed.

Blocking a public road, open sewage in a town or a factory poisoning a river are public nuisances. They are dealt with by prosecution, by the Magistrate's order for removal (s. 152 BNSS, formerly s. 133 CrPC) and by a representative suit under s. 91 CPC. In Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand (1980) the Supreme Court upheld an order requiring the municipality to build drains, rejecting its plea of lack of funds. A private person may sue for damages only if he suffers harm beyond the public, as in Campbell v. Paddington Corporation (1911).

In M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) the Supreme Court adopted the doctrine when a motel in the Kullu-Manali valley obtained a lease of riverside forest land and diverted the river Beas; the lease was quashed and the motel made to pay for restoring the environment. The doctrine treats the public as beneficiaries and the Government as a trustee bound to protect the resource.

Ordinary (compensatory) damages put the consumer back where he would have been; punitive (exemplary) damages punish. A company that knowingly keeps selling a dangerous product after complaints may be ordered to pay punitive damages on top of compensation. The 2019 Act made the power express for the consumer Commissions; in tort they are awarded rarely, for oppressive conduct by public servants or wilful wrongdoing.

Kelsen, who drafted the Austrian Constitution of 1920, wanted a science of law as rigorous as geometry. A legal norm says that if a certain condition occurs a sanction ought to follow; norms form a pyramid (the Stufenbau) from the constitution down to a court's order; the State is simply the legal order personified, and public law, private law and international law are one system. Critics (Laski: 'an exercise in logic, not in life'; Allen, Friedmann, Stone) say that purity is bought at the price of content and that the Grundnorm smuggles effectiveness, a sociological fact, back in.

Latin, from the old English action in assumpsit. Planche v. Colburn (1831): a publisher abandoned a series after the author had written much of his book, and the author got a fair sum for the work done. Craven-Ellis v. Canons (1936): a managing director under a void contract was paid the value of his services. It is a restitutionary claim, not damages: it looks at the value of what the defendant received, not at what the claimant lost. It does not lie while a valid contract fixing the price subsists.

'Quasi' means 'as if': the law treats the situation as if a contract existed, because the remedy is the same, though there was no offer or acceptance. Lord Mansfield's words in Moses v. Macferlan (1760), that the defendant is bound 'by the ties of natural justice and equity' to refund, are the classic source. The five Indian heads: necessaries supplied to an incapable person (s. 68), payment of money due by another (s. 69), benefit of a non-gratuitous act (s. 70), finder of goods (s. 71), money paid by mistake or under coercion (s. 72). Section 73 gives the same compensation for their breach as for breach of contract.

Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines an agent as a person employed to do any act for another or to represent him in dealings with third persons, and s. 226 makes contracts made through an agent enforceable as if made by the principal. The maxim also explains why a company, which can act only through its officers, is bound by their acts. Sentence: "The buyer who signed through his authorised agent cannot deny the contract: qui facit per alium facit per se."

A fee is a payment for a service rendered, a tax is not; the courts have asked whether there is a quid pro quo to tell them apart. Sentence: "The agreement fails for want of a quid pro quo: the promisee gave nothing in return."

Any member of the public may seek it, even without a personal interest. University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao (1965) laid down the conditions: a public office of a substantive character, and a holder not legally qualified. Sentence: "A writ of quo warranto was sought against the Vice-Chancellor, who lacked the ten years' teaching experience the Act required."

Finding the ratio is the first skill of case reading: strip the facts to the material ones, state the rule the court needed to decide them. The ratio of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) is that a minor's agreement is void ab initio. Sentence: "Counsel argued that the passage relied on was obiter and not the ratio decidendi of the earlier judgment."

In malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove that the defendant lacked it; an acquittal alone does not prove that. It is judged on the facts the prosecutor knew at the time, and acting on counsel's advice after full disclosure is strong evidence of it. If it exists, the prosecutor's spite does not matter (Glinski v. McIver, 1962).

An equitable remedy for a document that went wrong in the writing, not a bargain that went wrong in the making: the parties agreed one thing and the deed says another. The court rewrites the instrument to match the real agreement, provided third parties who acquired rights in good faith for value are not prejudiced, and may then specifically enforce it. Example: 'The sale deed described the wrong survey number, so the purchaser sued for rectification.' Conveyancing lawyers meet it when plot numbers, areas or names are mis-stated in registered deeds.

A "registry objection" is a defect in a filing pointed out by the Registrar's office; "the Registrar (Judicial)" lists cases. The student's letter for a bona fide certificate is addressed to the university Registrar. Sentence: "The Registrar returned the appeal memo for curing the defects within a week."

Re Polemis (1921) made a negligent defendant liable for all direct consequences, foreseeable or not (a plank dropped into a hold caused a spark and the ship burned). The Wagon Mound (No. 1) (1961) replaced this with the foreseeability test: oil spilled in Sydney Harbour that unexpectedly caught fire did not make the ship's charterers liable for the fire. The kind of harm must be foreseeable, but not its manner (Hughes v. Lord Advocate, 1963) or extent (Smith v. Leech Brain, 1962). In contract the test is Hadley v. Baxendale and s. 73 of the Contract Act.

The justification is spontaneity: a cry of "don't stab him" at the moment of the assault leaves no time for fabrication. In R. v. Bedingfield (1879) a statement made after the act was complete was excluded; Indian courts admit statements made "at once or almost at once" (Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A.P., 1996). Sentence: "The neighbour's shout naming the attacker was admitted as part of the res gestae."

A rule of evidence in negligence that shifts the burden of proof. Byrne v. Boadle (1863): a barrel of flour fell from a warehouse window on a passer-by. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti (1966): the collapse of the Clock Tower in Chandni Chowk, which killed passers-by, spoke for itself and the Corporation was held liable. Sentence: "A surgical sponge left inside the patient's abdomen calls for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur."

The rule rests on three maxims: nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no one should be vexed twice for the same cause), interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is in the interest of the State that litigation should end) and res judicata pro veritate accipitur (a judicial decision is accepted as correct). Daryao v. State of U.P. (1961) applied it even to writ petitions under Art. 32. Sentence: "The second suit for the same land, between the same parties, was barred by res judicata."

Roman law distinguished res nullius (no one's) from res communes (common to all, such as air and the sea) and from lost property, which still has an owner. A finder of lost goods does not get ownership, only a possessory title good against all but the owner (Armory v. Delamirie), and in India he is a bailee for the owner under s. 71 of the Contract Act; but a hunter who captures a wild animal in a place where he may hunt becomes its owner by occupation. Treasure found in the earth is governed in India by the Indian Treasure Trove Act, 1878, not by the finder's rule.

From the Latin rescindere, to cut back. A contract induced by coercion, undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation is voidable, and the victim may rescind it; the court may refuse rescission where he has ratified the contract, where the parties cannot be restored to their positions, where third parties have acquired rights in good faith for value, or where only a non-severable part is attacked (s. 27(2)). Example: 'The buyer rescinded the contract on discovering the seller's fraud and recovered the advance.' It appears in every suit to set aside a sale deed obtained by fraud.

In Haynes v. Harwood (1935) a policeman who stopped runaway horses in a crowded street, where they had been left unattended by the defendant's servant, recovered damages; he was acting under a duty in an emergency, not freely accepting a risk. Cardozo J in Wagner v. International Railway (1921): "Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief." The doctrine does not help where no one was in danger, as in Cutler v. United Dairies (1933), where a man who helped calm a horse in a field was held volens.

The reasons: the master chose the servant, controls his work, benefits from it and is better able to pay (the "deep pocket"). It applies to employer and employee and principal and agent, not to an independent contractor. In State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati (1962) the State was held liable for a government driver's negligence. Sentence: "The bus company must pay for the injury its driver caused on duty: respondeat superior."

The winner in the trial court becomes the respondent in the appeal, whether he was plaintiff or defendant below. In a writ petition the State and its officers are usually the respondents. Sentence: "The respondent-State filed a counter-affidavit denying the allegations."

Madhub Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss (1874) held that s. 27 does not import the English test of reasonableness: a restraint, partial or total, is void. Nordenfelt (1894) shows the English approach. A restraint operating during employment is valid (Niranjan Shankar Golikari, 1967); one that operates after the employee leaves is void (Superintendence Co. v. Krishan Murgai, 1980). Non-compete clauses in Indian employment contracts are drafted in the shadow of this rule.

A gas agency that will supply a cylinder only if the customer also buys a stove from it, or a dealer who holds back deliveries until a price increase takes effect, engages in a restrictive trade practice. The Commission may order it to stop (s. 39(1)(g)). Unlike an unfair trade practice, which deceives, a restrictive trade practice restricts the consumer's choice or the market's supply.

Review is not an appeal in disguise: an erroneous decision cannot be reheard on merits; only a patent error can be corrected. A criminal court cannot review its judgment except to correct a clerical error (s. 403 BNSS; s. 362 CrPC). Sentence: "The review petition was dismissed as it merely repeated the arguments already rejected."

Unlike an appeal, revision is not a rehearing on facts; the court looks only at jurisdiction and legality, and the party has no right to it. The High Court and the Sessions Judge have criminal revisional powers. Sentence: "A revision was filed against the order of the Rent Controller, from which no appeal lay."

England abolished the immunity by the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. In India, P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State (1861) and State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati (1962) held the State liable like a private employer, though Kasturi Lal v. State of U.P. (1965) still denied liability for "sovereign" functions; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) awards compensation for violation of fundamental rights regardless of the maxim. Sentence: "The State cannot shelter behind rex non potest peccare when its constable negligently injures a passer-by."

'Whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law' is Hart's example for England. The rule is not itself valid or invalid; it simply exists, shown by the way judges and officials treat certain sources as authoritative. That is the difference from Kelsen's Grundnorm, which is a presupposition rather than a social fact. For India the rule of recognition is the officials' acceptance of the Constitution as supreme: Article 13 declares inconsistent laws void, Article 141 makes the Supreme Court's declarations binding, and after Kesavananda Bharati even an amendment is recognised only if it leaves the basic structure intact.

The words are Cicero's (De Legibus) and were adopted by the common law. In India the maxim lies behind the "reasonable restrictions" on fundamental rights in Art. 19(2)-(6), the power of eminent domain, the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and the Disaster Management Act, 2005 under which the COVID-19 lockdown orders were made. Sentence: "Demolition of houses built on the flood plain was upheld, for salus populi suprema lex."

From the Latin sanctio, the penalty clause of a Roman statute. Bentham listed physical, political, moral and religious sanctions; Austin kept only the political one, the evil the sovereign will inflict, and so the "sanction" became the third leg of his command-duty-sanction model. Critics (Hart, Olivecrona) point out that many laws, such as those conferring the power to make a will or a contract, impose no sanction at all, and that people obey law for many reasons other than fear. In Indian law the sanctions of criminal justice are listed in s. 4 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 (death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment, forfeiture, fine and community service); the sanctions of civil justice are damages, injunctions and specific performance.

The phrase is used to explain what volenti non fit injuria is not. In Smith v. Baker and Sons (1891) a workman knew that a crane swung stones over his head; when a stone fell on him, the employers argued that he knew the danger. The House of Lords held that knowledge (scienti) is not consent (volenti): he had stayed at work because his job required it, not because he agreed to be hit. Examiners often ask students to explain "volenti, not scienti, non fit injuria".

After Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992, the Hillsborough case), a secondary victim recovers only with a close tie of love and affection to the victim, proximity in time and space to the event or its immediate aftermath, and perception by his own unaided senses. A mother who sees her child hit by a bus qualifies; an uncle who hears of it by telephone does not. A primary victim, such as the unhurt driver in Page v. Smith (1996), needs only to show that physical injury was foreseeable.

Every woman in a domestic relationship has a right to reside in the shared household (s. 17) and the Magistrate may pass residence orders (s. 19). S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (2007) limited it to the husband's own or joint family house, but Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020) overruled that: a house owned by the in-laws, where the wife lived with her husband, can be a shared household. The right is one of residence, not ownership.

Parliament and State Assemblies are adjourned sine die by the presiding officer at the end of a session, after which the President or Governor prorogues the House (Art. 85, Art. 174). A court seldom adjourns sine die, because the CPC requires a next date; a case kept "sine die" is one awaiting the result of another. Sentence: "The Lok Sabha was adjourned sine die after passing the Finance Bill."

Saying at a public meeting that a shopkeeper cheats his customers is slander. In England the plaintiff must show actual loss (lost customers) unless the words impute a crime punishable with imprisonment, a contagious disease, or unfitness for his office, profession or trade, which are actionable per se. Indian courts generally treat slander, like libel, as actionable per se; in Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy (Delhi, 2006) damages were awarded for allegations made at a press conference.

Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School, asked lawyers to study law in action rather than law in books, to catalogue the interests pressing for recognition and to weigh them by jural postulates (people may expect no intentional aggression, security in what they have acquired, good faith in dealings, due care, and that dangerous things be kept in bounds). The Supreme Court's balancing of industry against public health in the Vellore Citizens case, and of employers' freedom against women's safety in Vishaka, is social engineering in practice. Critics say society is not a machine and that Pound never tells us how to weigh one interest against another.

Duguit, a French public lawyer, saw that the farmer, the weaver and the doctor depend on one another; society survives by this solidarity, and a rule that promotes it is law whether or not the State has enacted it, while a statute that breaks it is not law at all. The State is a group of persons running public services (roads, schools, courts) and is bound by this objective law like everyone else. Critics (Laski, Allen, Friedmann) say solidarity is itself a vague moral ideal, so Duguit's sociology is natural law in disguise, and that abolishing rights in words does not abolish them in fact.

From Latin sollicitare, to urge. The old English brief to counsel was prepared by the solicitor. Sentence: "The company's solicitors sent the notice of termination and briefed senior counsel for the arbitration."

Jean Bodin (1576) first described sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth"; Hobbes made it the price of escaping the state of nature; Austin made it the source of all law, since law is the command of the sovereign backed by a sanction. Dicey distinguished the legal sovereign (in Britain, Parliament) from the political sovereign (the electorate). Sovereignty is one of the four elements of a State with population, territory and government. In India the Preamble declares the republic "Sovereign", the people are the political sovereign, and no organ, not even Parliament, is legally sovereign in the Austinian sense: Parliament's amending power is limited by the basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973). The Emergency of 1975-77 and ADM Jabalpur are the stock examples of what an unlimited sovereign looks like in practice.

In England the Crown could not be sued until the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. India inherited the rule through the East India Company cases (P. and O. Steam Navigation, 1861) and Article 300, which keeps the State's liability as it was before the Constitution until Parliament legislates. The Supreme Court made the State pay for a negligent jeep driver (Vidyawati, 1962) but not for a constable who stole seized gold, because seizure was a "sovereign" act (Kasturilal, 1965). N. Nagendra Rao (1994) cut the immunity down to functions such as defence and foreign affairs, and the constitutional-tort cases (Rudul Sah, Bhim Singh, Nilabati Behera, D.K. Basu) hold that sovereign immunity is no defence at all to a claim for compensation under Articles 32 and 226 for the violation of a fundamental right. Diplomatic and foreign-State immunity (s. 86 CPC) are related but distinct.

A remedy that began in the English Court of Chancery for cases where money could not make the plaintiff whole, typically a contract to sell a particular house or a rare painting. Before 2018 Indian courts granted it only in their discretion when damages were inadequate; the 2018 Amendment made it the rule, refused only for the contracts listed in s. 14, where the plaintiff was not ready and willing (s. 16), or where a trustee exceeded his powers (s. 11(2)). Example: 'The buyer sued for specific performance of the agreement to sell the flat, and the court ordered the seller to execute the sale deed.' A lawyer meets it in every suit on an agreement to sell immovable property.

A counterfeit branded watch sold online as original, or a fake medicine packed to look like a known brand, is spurious. Manufacturing or offering spurious goods is an unfair trade practice (s. 2(47)(vi)), and manufacturing, storing, selling, distributing or importing them is an offence under s. 91, punishable up to life imprisonment and a fine of at least Rs 10 lakh where a consumer dies, with suspension or cancellation of licences.

Full form stare decisis et non quieta movere (stand by decisions and do not disturb settled things). A larger Bench of the Supreme Court may overrule a smaller one; the Court is not bound by its own earlier view (Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, 1955). Sentence: "Bound by stare decisis, the High Court followed the Supreme Court's reading of s. 27 of the Contract Act."

Full form status quo ante (the state before): restoring the position as it was before an event. Courts often pass a status quo order instead of a full injunction at the first hearing. Sentence: "The parties shall maintain status quo with regard to possession of the suit property till the next date."

In the patriarchal family of ancient law the son, the wife and the slave had the rights their status gave them and no power to change it; the pater familias held them all. As societies progressed, people began to make their own legal relations by contract: a worker chooses an employer, a buyer a seller. Maine's critics note the reverse movement of the welfare state, labour law and consumer protection, where the law again fixes rights by status (employee, consumer, tenant) and limits freedom of contract; some call it a movement 'from contract to status'.

A railway authorised to run engines is not liable for sparks that set fire to woods beside the line if it took all precautions (Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway, 1860), nor for the vibration of its trains (Hammersmith Railway v. Brand, 1869). It is liable if it is negligent, for instance by leaving dry trimmings by the line (Smith v. London and South Western Railway, 1870). A merely permissive power must be used without causing a nuisance (Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill, 1881, smallpox hospital). Statutory authority is also an exception to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.

A right born in the mercantile custom of the eighteenth century and preserved by the Act. Transit lasts from delivery to a carrier for transmission to the buyer until the buyer or his agent takes delivery (s. 51); it ends if the buyer obtains delivery before arrival, if the carrier acknowledges that he now holds for the buyer, or if the carrier wrongfully refuses to deliver. The seller exercises the right by taking actual possession or by notice to the carrier (s. 52). Example: 'Hearing that the buyer had been declared insolvent, the exporter telegraphed the shipping company and stopped the goods in transit.' It is a question of fact about when transit ends, as in Lyons v. Hoffnung and Kemp v. Falk.

Ordinarily the law asks whether you were at fault. Strict liability does not: if you bring on your land something likely to do mischief if it escapes (a reservoir, gas, explosives) and it escapes and harms your neighbour, you pay although you took every care. Blackburn J. in Rylands v. Fletcher: you keep it "at your peril". The liability is strict, not absolute, because five defences remain: act of God, act of a stranger, the plaintiff's own default, the plaintiff's consent and statutory authority. Criminal law also has strict liability offences where a statute dispenses with mens rea (adulterated food, the Foreign Exchange case of Mayer Hans George). In India the Supreme Court went further in M.C. Mehta and created absolute liability for hazardous industries.

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (s. 3) protects fair reporting but not comment that interferes with the course of justice; "media trials" of pending cases are criticised on this ground. Sentence: "The minister declined to comment, saying the matter was sub judice."

Salmond's example is Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. (1936): the Court of Appeal allowed a garnishee order against a company, which assumed that the order could be made, but nobody had argued whether it could; a later court held the point open because it had passed sub silentio. The reason is that a precedent binds only for what the court actually decided after argument, its ratio decidendi; an unargued assumption is not a ratio. The Indian Supreme Court accepted the rule in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) and in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989). It sits with per incuriam in the list of circumstances that weaken the binding force of a precedent.

A 2018 innovation aimed at keeping projects moving: instead of waiting years for a decree, the innocent party gets the work done elsewhere and sends the bill to the defaulter. The price is that once he has done so he cannot ask for specific performance (s. 20(3)), though he may still claim compensation (s. 20(4)); and he recovers the expenses only if he actually got the contract performed. Example: 'When the contractor abandoned the site, the owner gave the thirty-day notice and obtained substituted performance through another builder.' Construction and supply lawyers now draft their notices around it.

Used of a right or body that fits no category: the Election Commission's powers under Art. 324, the protection of plant varieties by a sui generis system under TRIPS. Sentence: "The Lok Adalat is a sui generis forum, neither a court nor an arbitral tribunal."

"Summons" is singular (plural "summonses"). It is served personally, by registered post or, now, electronically; refusal to accept it is good service. Non-appearance after service leads to an ex parte decree in a civil suit and a warrant in a criminal case. Sentence: "The summons was served on the defendant by affixing it on the door of his house."

Often misspelt "suo moto". The power flows from Arts. 32, 129, 215 and 226 of the Constitution and s. 151 CPC. In 2020 the Supreme Court took suo motu cognizance of the plight of migrant workers during the lockdown (In re: Problems and Miseries of Migrant Labourers). A High Court may also revise a lower court's order suo motu under s. 438 of the BNSS, 2023 (s. 397 CrPC). Sentence: "The High Court took suo motu cognizance of the custodial death reported in the morning papers."

Also called an interim or interlocutory injunction: it preserves the status quo while the case is pending so that the final decree is not rendered useless. The applicant must show a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience favours him and that he would otherwise suffer irreparable injury (Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh). Example: 'The court granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from selling the disputed plot till the disposal of the suit.' It is the first application a litigator files in most property and commercial suits.

Also called the egg-shell skull rule. In Smith v. Leech Brain (1962) a workman's lip was burned by molten metal through his employer's negligence; the burn activated a pre-malignant condition and he died of cancer. The employer was liable for the death: the burn was foreseeable, and the extent of harm need not be. The rule survived the foreseeability test of The Wagon Mound.

The victim of an accident is a stranger to the contract between the owner and the insurer, yet the Act lets him recover the award directly from the insurer (s. 150), which can resist only on the grounds listed in s. 150(2). A policy must cover any person killed or injured, including the owner of goods carried, third-party property and passengers of transport vehicles, but not gratuitous passengers of a goods vehicle (s. 147). Example: a pedestrian knocked down by an insured car recovers from the insurer even if the owner is penniless. Leading cases: Skandia Insurance v. Kokilaben (1987); National Insurance v. Swaran Singh (2004).

From the Latin tortum, "twisted". Salmond: "a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages, and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust or other merely equitable obligation"; s. 2(m) of the Limitation Act 1963: "a civil wrong which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust". Negligent driving, nuisance, defamation, trespass and false imprisonment are torts. The essence is the violation of a legal right (Ashby v. White, 1703), not mere loss (Gloucester Grammar School Case, 1410).

The driver who carelessly knocks down a pedestrian, the newspaper that publishes a libel, the factory whose gas escapes - each is a tortfeasor. Where several persons commit the same tort together they are joint tortfeasors, each liable for the whole damage. A master who is vicariously liable for his servant's tort is treated as a joint tortfeasor with the servant (Lloyd v. Grace, Smith and Co., 1912).

In the Six Carpenters' Case (1610) carpenters who entered an inn and refused to pay for a second round of wine were not trespassers ab initio, because not paying was a mere omission (non-feasance), not a positive act. A police officer who enters under a warrant and then damages unrelated property would be. The doctrine applies only to authority given by law, not to a licence from the occupier, and Lord Denning doubted its value in Chic Fashions v. Jones (1968).

The exception to caveat emptor: under s. 17 of the Indian Contract Act silence is not fraud unless there is a duty to speak, and contracts of insurance, partnership, family settlement and fiduciary relations create that duty. In Mithoolal Nayak v. LIC (1962) a policy was avoided because the assured concealed a past illness. Sentence: "A life policy is a contract uberrimae fidei; concealing a heart condition in the proposal form voids it."

In Ashby v. White (1703) a voter whose vote was wrongly refused recovered damages though his candidate had won: the violation of a legal right is itself actionable. In Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985) an MLA illegally detained was awarded compensation under Art. 32. Limits: it protects legal rights only, not moral claims, and there is no remedy for damnum sine injuria. Sentence: "Even though the statute provides no appeal, the High Court may act under Art. 226, for ubi jus ibi remedium."

Company law: Ashbury Railway Carriage Co. v. Riche (1875), a contract outside the objects clause was void. Administrative law: rules made by a minister beyond the parent Act are ultra vires and struck down. The opposite is intra vires. Sentence: "The by-law imposing a tax the Municipalities Act did not authorise was held ultra vires."

A builder's agreement that charges the buyer 18 per cent interest for late instalments but pays only a token amount for the builder's own delay, or lets the builder cancel the allotment at will, is an unfair contract. Complaints against unfair contracts lie only to the State Commission (consideration up to Rs 10 crore) and the National Commission (above), which may declare the offending terms null and void (ss. 47(1)(a)(ii), 49(2), 58(1)(a)(ii), 59(2)). The concept is new in 2019; under the 1986 Act a consumer was generally held to the terms he signed (Bharathi Knitting Co. v. DHL, 1996).

Selling a reconditioned phone as new, advertising a 'sale' price for stock that does not exist, or promising a 'free gift' whose cost is hidden in the price are unfair trade practices. A consumer may complain of one to a Commission (s. 2(6)(i)), which may order it to be discontinued and not repeated (s. 39(1)(g)); the Central Consumer Protection Authority can act against it for consumers as a class (ss. 18-20). The concept came into Indian law through the MRTP Act in 1984 and the 1986 Act (s. 2(1)(r)).

The modern name for Lord Mansfield's 'ties of natural justice and equity' (Moses v. Macferlan, 1760); the Latin tag is nemo debet locupletari ex aliena jactura. Lord Wright in Fibrosa (1943) made it the basis of English restitution. In India it is both a sword, grounding refunds under s. 72 and payment for benefits under s. 70, and a shield: in Mafatlal Industries (1997) a manufacturer who had passed the tax on to its customers was refused a refund because it would itself be unjustly enriched.

A pedestrian knocked down by a car has no agreement with the driver fixing compensation, so the court assesses it: medical bills, lost earnings, pain and suffering. That is why Salmond and Winfield define tort by "an action for unliquidated damages". Liquidated damages, a sum agreed in advance, belong to contract (s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act 1872).

The status matters because the Act arms the unpaid seller with rights against the goods themselves even after property has passed to the buyer: a lien to retain them while in his possession (ss. 47 to 49), the right to stop them in transit if the buyer becomes insolvent (ss. 50 to 52) and a right of resale (s. 54), besides his personal remedies of a suit for the price (s. 55) or damages for non-acceptance (s. 56). Example: 'As an unpaid seller the mill exercised its lien and refused to release the cotton until the cheque was honoured.' Trade lawyers invoke it when a buyer defaults or goes insolvent.

Bentham opened his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) with the sentence "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure", and proposed a "felicific calculus" to weigh them. He used the principle to attack natural rights ("nonsense upon stilts"), to demand codification and to lay the foundations of the analytical school: the expositor says what the law is, the censor says what, on the test of utility, it ought to be. Austin, his pupil, took utility as the index of the law of God. The theory is criticised for ignoring the distribution of happiness (the majority may oppress a minority), for treating all pleasures as commensurable, and, as Rawls argued, for not taking seriously the separateness of persons. Indian students meet it in the questions "the purpose of law is to increase pleasure and reduce pain" and in the deterrent theory of punishment, which is utilitarian in spirit.

An Urdu-Persian word (vakalat, advocacy + nama, document); the English equivalent is "memorandum of appearance" or "power of attorney to an advocate". The vakalatnama usually authorises the advocate to compromise, withdraw and receive money, so clients should read it. Sentence: "The advocate filed his vakalatnama on behalf of the defendant and sought time to file the written statement."

The general rule is that you answer only for your own wrongs. Vicarious liability is the exception, justified by two maxims: qui facit per alium facit per se (he who acts through another acts himself) and respondeat superior (let the master answer). The master chooses the servant, controls the work and takes the profit, has the deeper pocket and can insure, so the law makes him answer for torts committed in the course of employment, even those he forbade. The State is liable in the same way for its servants' torts in non-sovereign functions (State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, the government jeep), but Kasturilal exempted "sovereign" functions until N. Nagendra Rao confined that exemption to a narrow core. In criminal law vicarious liability is exceptional and needs a statute. Salmond treats it as a kind of absolute liability, because the master is liable without any fault of his own.

A suit for money must be filed within three years, for possession of immovable property within twelve (Limitation Act, 1963, Schedule); a writ petition filed after years of inaction may be dismissed for laches. The rule is softened by s. 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows delay to be condoned for "sufficient cause" (Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, 1987). Sentence: "The claim, filed ten years after the breach, was time-barred: vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt."

Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903): the mortgage executed by a minor was void ab initio and the lender could not recover even the money advanced. Sentence: "An order passed by a court without jurisdiction is void ab initio and can be ignored."

Contrast the void agreement, which is a nullity from the start (s. 2(g)), with the voidable contract, which is good until set aside. The option belongs to the party whose consent was not free. If he rescinds he must restore any benefit received (s. 64); if he affirms, or if third-party rights intervene, the right to avoid is lost. Contracts voidable under s. 39 (refusal to perform), s. 53 (prevention of performance) and s. 55 (time of the essence) are also in this class. A client cheated into a sale has a voidable, not a void, contract, so speed matters.

The phrase is rarely used by name in Indian courts, which have no jury, but the practice exists: a judge who tests a child witness's understanding before swearing him, or examines the voluntariness of a confession, is holding a voir dire. Sentence: "Before recording the child's evidence the judge held a short voir dire to satisfy himself that she understood the duty to speak the truth."

Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club (1933): a spectator at a motor race accepts the risk of a crash. Smith v. Baker (1891): a workman who knew stones were swung over his head had not consented to the risk, so the defence failed. It does not protect an unlawful act or defeat a rescuer (Haynes v. Harwood, 1935). In India, Padmavati v. Dugganaika (1975) applied it to passengers taking a free lift in a jeep. Sentence: "The boxer cannot sue his opponent for a broken nose: volenti non fit injuria."

Savigny raised the idea in 1814 against Thibaut's call for a German civil code: a code drafted by scholars would be premature until jurists had understood the law living in the people's customs. Custom is the first and truest source; the lawyers later become the organ of the Volksgeist; legislation comes last. Critics (Allen, Ihering, Friedmann, Stone) point out that much 'popular' custom is the custom of a ruling class, that Savigny himself championed Roman law in Germany, and that nations borrow laws wholesale. In India the respect for custom in Article 13(3)(a) and in the personal laws is the historical school's legacy.

Differs from estoppel: waiver is a deliberate abandonment, estoppel a bar arising from the other party's reliance. Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act lets a promisee dispense with or remit performance; a party who proceeds with an arbitration without objecting waives the objection (s. 4, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996). Sentence: "By accepting the delayed delivery without protest, the buyer waived his right to reject the goods."

A bailable warrant directs the officer to release the person on bail; a non-bailable warrant does not. In cognizable offences the police may arrest without a warrant. The word also means a guarantee ("warranty") and a justification ("no warrant for that reading"). Sentence: "A non-bailable warrant was issued as the accused had repeatedly ignored the summons."

From Old English writ, a writing; in England every action once began with a royal writ. Art. 32 is itself a fundamental right, which Dr Ambedkar called "the heart and soul" of the Constitution; Art. 226 is wider, covering "any other purpose". Sentence: "The detenu's wife moved the High Court by a writ petition under Art. 226."

A general denial is not enough: an allegation not specifically denied may be taken as admitted (Order VIII Rule 5). Sentence: "In his written statement the defendant pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation."