Court case[1962] AC 726

Glinski v. McIver

[1962] AC 726 · House of Lords · 1962

PrincipleWhere a prosecutor has reasonable and probable cause, an action for malicious prosecution fails even if he was actuated by malice.

Facts

McIver, a police officer, was involved in investigating a fraud and charged Glinski with a fraud offence. Glinski was tried and acquitted. He then sued McIver for malicious prosecution, alleging that McIver had prosecuted him not because he believed him guilty but out of resentment because Glinski had earlier given evidence for the defence in another criminal case in which McIver had been concerned. McIver had acted on the information gathered in the investigation and after taking legal advice. Glinski succeeded at the trial before a jury, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, and Glinski appealed.

Held

The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. The officer had material before him, and legal advice, on which a reasonable man could conclude that there was a proper case to put before the court; there was therefore reasonable and probable cause, and it was not shown that he did not honestly believe in the case he laid. Whether the facts amounted to reasonable and probable cause is a question for the judge; the jury should be asked only about disputed facts, including the prosecutor's honest belief, and only where there is evidence of lack of belief. Lord Devlin explained that the prosecutor need not believe that the accused will probably be convicted; it is enough that he honestly believes, on reasonable grounds, that there is a proper case to lay before the court. Once reasonable and probable cause exists, the prosecutor's malice or motive is irrelevant.

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